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ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS CONSTRUCTED ON UNITED
STATES CONTINENTAL SHELF DENIED STATUS
OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY

The United States brought injunction and trespass claims
in the federal district court against three private persons
to prevent the unauthorized construction of artificial islands
atop several submerged coral reefs located about four and onehalf miles off the southeast coast of Florida. These reefs
were composed of the skeletal remains of coral organisms and
lay at a depth of 600 feet. The reefs continued to grow
laterally, but had reached their maximum height and were
completely submerged at all times except at low tide when their
highest projections were momentarily visible. The reef area,
which harbored countless varieties of marine life and was used
extensively both for commercial and sport fishing and for
navigation, was included within the Department of Interior's
proposed Biscayne National Monument. 1 Both defendant Louis M.
Ray, a Louisiana resident; and co-defendant-intervenor, Atlantis
Development Corporation, Ltd., a Bahamian corporation, sought to
establish independent sovereign states by constructing artificial
islands on the reefs. Both parties proposed to commercialize
the islands by selling ocean frontage; additionally, Atlantis
intended to operate a gambling casino and charter a bank with
accounts analogous to secret Swiss bank accounts. The government argued that the submerged reefs--a natural resource of the
continental shelf--were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the United States under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act 2 and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf. 3 Therefore, contended the government, the defendants'
drilling and dredging activities constituted a trespass on
government property and should be enjoined. The government
argued further that the erection of an artificial island without authorization by the Secretary of the Army violated the
Outer Continental Shelf Land Act 4 and, therefore, should be enjoined. The defendants contended that the reefs were res
nullius islands amenable to occupation, control, and use, and
that they were therefore subject to a lawful appropriation and
1 Subsequent

to the hearing of the instant case, Congress
created Biscayne National Monument which included the two reefs,
known as Triumph and Long Reefs, which are geographically located at latitude 25 degrees 27' north and longitude 80 degrees
07' west. Charted evidence of the reefs first appeared on the
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart No. 166, issued in 1878.
243 U.S.C. §1331 (1964).
3 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.55.
443 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964).
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a valid claim of sovereignty under international law. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted the injunction, but denied the trespass
claimo 5 The court held that submerged offshore reefs on the
seabed of the continental shelf are not islands amenable to a
claim of sovereignty but are natural resources of the United
States; and in the absence of the required permit, construction activities on the reefs are unlawful. But where the
United States has neither claimed title to nor taken actual
possession of the reefs, common law trespass quare clausum
fregit will not lie. United States v. Ray, 294 F. Supp. 532
(S.D. Fla. 1969).
The instant case involves the balancing of interests
between the right of a state to exercise control over its
continental shelf and the right of any state or person
validly to proclaim sovereignty over an unowned island
located on the high seas. and amenable to control, possession,
and use. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
grants to coastal states exclusive sovereign rights over the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental
shelf for the purposes of exploration and exploitation. 6 The
continental shelf is defined as "the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast . . . to a depth of

200 meters [656 feet] or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth

.

.

. admits of the exploitation of the natural resources."17

There are other forms of control that the coastal state may
exert over the adjacent waters. For example, the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone grants to
the coastal state general sovereign rights within its territorial
sea (subject to a foreign ship's right of innocent passage) and
jurisdiction in a sea area beyond the territorial sea for certain
types of acts detrimental to the good order of the coastal state,
including the violation of fiscal regulations. 8 The 1958 Geneva
5 The

court rejected the defendants' preliminary procedural
objection that the court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction since the reefs and the defendants' activities thereon
were outside the United States' three-mile limit. Subject matter
jurisdiction was present because the case arose out of the interpretation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, a law of the
United States.
6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
13/L.55, art. 2(1). Art. 2(4) defines
natural resources as "the mineral and other non-living resources
of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging
to sedentary species . . . organisms which, at the harvestable

stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable
to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or
the subsoil."
71d., art. 1.
8 U.N.

Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52.
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Art. i(i) provides:

"The

Convention on the High Seas 9 provides, however, that the high
seas--that sea area beyond the territorial sea--are open to
all states and are not subject to claims of sovereignty.
Since the United States claims a three mile territorial sea,
under convention law it cannot enjoin an appropriation of reefs
beyond that three mile limit unless such reefs constitute part
of the natural resources of the seabed or subsoil of the
continental shelf or unless such activities on the reefs
violate the United States' internal fiscal regulations. 1 0 In
addition to these international rights, the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act provides that all submerged lands lying seaward of the area reserved to the state and appertaining to the
United States are the continental shelf over which the United
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control. 1 1 While
the Act encompasses a greater submarine area than the
Convention's continental shelf, the Convention recognizes
sovereign rights in the seabed and subsoil whdreas the Act
12
grants only "jurisdiction and control.o"
Whether a submerged reef constitutes an island in the
high seas amenable to a sovereign claim or constitutes a
natural resource of the seabed has not been determined. Had
sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory and
its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast,
described as the territorial sea." Art. 14(1) provides:
"[S]hips of all states . . . shall enjoy the right of in-

nocent passage through the territorial sea." Art. 24 provides
that in a zone contiguous to the coastal state's territorial
sea, but not extending beyond twelve miles from the coast
(a)
"the coastal state may exercise control necessary to:
Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea."
9 UoN. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53.
1 0 The instant court declined to exercise jurisdiction on
the high seas as a reasonable measure to prevent the violation
of local law. Such jurisdiction was successfully exercised,
however, in The S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), [1927] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 10, where a state made its law applicable to foreign
nationals while they were outside its territorial sovereignty.
1143 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (L964).
1 2 The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act gives no outer
But Congress has considered
shelf.
continental
boundary to the
it to extend seaward at least to the depth of waters around
the contested reefs, 600 feet (175 meters), which is about 25
meters short of the 200-meter minimum depth allowed by the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. H.R. REP. NO. 413, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953). Thus Triumph and Long Reefs are
clearly on the continental shelf under both the Act and the
Convention.
140

that artificial structures on the high seas, such as lighthouses, have been characterized as territory subject to the
sovereignty of the state owning or controlling them.
Hence,
the erection of an artificial structure on a submerged reef
on a state's continental shelf, and the subsequent control,
occupation, and use of that structure, could be deemed the
creation of an island and the perfection of a valid claim
of sovereignty.
In the instant case, the court dismissed the defendants'
proprietary claims to the reefs and their claims to
sovereignty by denying the status of "island" to the reefs.
It relied on United States v. California 2 3 vhich held that an
island is a "naturally formed area of land surrounded by
water, which is above the level of mean high water."
"Mean
high water" was defined in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of
Los Angeles 2 4 to be the average height of all high waters over
a given location during a span of 18.6 years.
Since the reefs
were completely submerged at mean high water, they could not
be islands.
The instant court also held that the reefs were within
both the domestic and international definitions of the
continental shelf and subject to exclusive United States control and jurisdiction.2 5
The reefs were part of the shelf's
natural resources both practically and legally. Their asthetic
value to naturalists, commercial value to fishermen, and
recreational value to sportsmen made the reefs a natural resource. Furthermore, the reefs specifically fit definitions
of natural resources in both the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
26
Act and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The defendants' construction of artificial islands without the
statutory permit 2 7 was therefore unlawful and properly enjoined.
The government's common law trespass action failed, however,
22

(Remarks of Sir Charles Russel) (1893), 1 J. MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 755, 900-01 (1898).
23382 U.S. 448 (1966).
24296 U.S. 10 (1935).
2 5 See

1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L.52;
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (1964).
2643 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1964), defines natural resources as
including "without limiting the generality thereof, oil, gas, and

all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs,
lobster, sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and plant life...."
2 7 Section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.

§ 403 (1964), which is incorporated in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964), requires approval from the
Secretary of the Army to build any construction which affects the
"navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States."
142

the reefs in the instant case been islands, however they would
Naturallyhave been subject to a valid claim of sovereignty. 1
formed islands in the high seas are res nullius over which a
state may establish sovereignty by taking possession and maintaining a continuous display of state functions. 1 4 Usually
the ceremonial raising of a flag and an express proclamation
to establish sovereignty are sufficient) 1 5 The fact that the
island rests on another state's continental shelf, outside its
territorial sea, is irrelevant since the Convention on the
Continental Shelf confers sovereign rights to the coastal state
only for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of the shelf's seabed and subsoil.
The term "island" is defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, for the purpose
of delimiting the territorial sea, as a "naturally-formed area of

'1 6
land, surrounded by waiter, which is above water at high tide."
18
Generally, submerged land masses 1 7 and artificial structures
are not deemed islands because they are not natural formations of
land above water. On the other hand, the Acts of the Hague
Conference of 1930 included in the concept, island, "any area of
land, surrounded by water, which is permanently above the high
water mark."'1 9 That conference expressed the view that artificial
islands should enjoy the status of naturally-formed islands provided they rest upon the seabed and are capable of supporting
human occupationo 2 0 It has been suggested recently that if
artificially constructed islands are visible in normal weather,
are relatively permanent, are in the nature of territory, and
are capable of occupation, they enjoy the same status as naturally
formed islands. 2 1 In the Fur Seal Arbitration it was indicated
1 3 C.

COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 129
(6th ed. 1967).
14 1d.;
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 22, 46; Arbitration between
France and Mexico (Clipperton Island), reported in 26 AM. J.
INT'L L. 390 (1932); The Island of Palmas Case (the United
States and the Netherlands), P.Ct. Arb. (1928), 2 U.N. REP.
INT'L ARB. AWARDS 829 (1949).
1 5 KELLER,
LISSITZYN & MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF
SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS, 1400-1800, at 148-49 (1938).
1 6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52, art. 10.
1 7 C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 137
(6th ed. 1967).
18M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
397 (1962); R. LUMB, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND AUSTRALIAN OFFSHORE AREAS 22 (1966).
1 9 League
of Nations pub. C. 230 M. 117, 1930 V., at 131,
cited in G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (1942).
2 0 See Johnson, Artificial Islands, 4 INT'L L.Q. 203 (1951).
2 l ?d
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that artificial structures on the high seas, such as lighthouses, have been characterized as territory subject to the
sovereignty of the state owning or controlling them.2 2 Hence,
the erection of an atrificial structure on a submerged reef
on a state's continental shelf, and the subsequent control,
occupation, and use of that structure, could be deemed the
creation of an island and the perfection of a valid claim
of sovereignty.
In the instant case, the court dismissed the defendants'
proprietary claims to the reefs and their claims to
sovereignty by denying the status of "island"
to the reefs.
It relied on United States v. California 2 3 which held that an
island is a "naturally formed area of land surrounded by
water."
"Mean high water" was defined in Borax Consolidated,

Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles 2 4 to be the average height of all
high waters over a given location during a span of 18.6 years.
Since the reefs were completely submerged at mean high water,
they could not be islands.
The instant court also held that the reefs were within
both the domestic and international definitions of the
continental shelf and subject to exclusive United States control and jurisdiction. 2 5 The reefs were part of the shelf's
natural resources both practically and legally. Their asthetic
value to naturalists, commercial value to fisherman, and
recreational value to sportsmen made the reefs a natural resource. Furthermore, the reefs specifically fit definitions
of natural resources in both the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
26
Act and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The defendants' construction of artificial islands without the
statutory permit 2 7 was therefore unlawful and properly enjoined.
The government's common law trespass action failed, however,
22(Remarks of Sir Charles Russel) (1893), 1 J. MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 755, 900-01 (1898).
23382 U.S. 448 (1966). By "water", the court meant "man high water.
24296 U.S. 10 (1935).
2 5 See

1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.52; The Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
2643 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1964), defines natural resources
as including "without limiting the generality thereof, oil,
gas, and all other minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams,
crabs, lobster, sponges, kelp, and other marine animal and
plant life . .. ."
2 7 Section

10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1964), which is incorporated in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1964),
requires approval from the Secretary of the Army to build any
construction which affects the "navigable capacity of any of
the waters of the United States."
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because the court found that the United States was not in actual
or constructive possession of the reefs. The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act speaks not of ownership, but only of "jurisdiction,
Moreover, President
control, and power of disposition." 2 8
Truman's Proclamation of 1945,29 affording the United States the
"jurisdiction and control" necessary to conserve and prudently
utilize its natural resources, did not grant ownership rights.
This distinction between jurisdiction and control and title was
made clear in the Submerged Lands Act 30 by which the United States
released to the states "all right, title, and interest" in certain
coastal submarine areas while retaining only jurisdiction and
control over the remaining continental shelf. Since the United
States had neither claimed title to nor taken actual possession
of the reefs, but had merely retained control and jurisdiction
to ensure the orderly enjoyment of the shelf, the trespass claim
31
would not lie.
Undoubtedly the court's decision is consistent with national
policy. The United States should be able to prohibit the utilization of her continental shelf as a means of evading her revenue
laws. Furthermore, the construction of artificial islands, such
as those in the instant case, could eventually harbor missile
sites or other threats to the security of the United States.
The court did not, however, resolve the broad issue of the status
of the artificial structures. Whether a submerged natural formation is an island amenable to sovereignty should depend on its
character in relation to the surrounding geographic area and on
the right of the world community to rely upon the permanent
geographical boundaries of sovereign states as a means of
achieving international stability. For example, a mountain
erupting from the middle of the Pacific Ocean should not be denied
island status merely because it fails to pierce the surface by a
few feet. If an artificial structure which is permanent and
capable of supporting human habitation can be built upon such a
seamount, it should be amenable to a valid claim of sovereignty.
On the other hand, a submerged coral reef rising a few hundred
feet from a state's continental shelf, composed of marine resources
and enjoyed by the coastal state should not be treated as an island
amenable to foreign claims of sovereignty. While a claim of
sovereignty over a seamount in the center of the ocean would not
seriously disturb the geographic relationship among nations, the
2843 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
2 9 Proclamation of Sept. 28, 1945,
59 Stat. 884, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12303.
3043 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (1964).
31 Stand, Wed
Land: The Unavailable Resource of the Outer
Continental Shelf, 2 J. LAW & ECON. DEV. 153, 180 (1968).
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sudden presence of a foreign territory on a state's continental
shelf would upset the justified expectation that existing land
masses establish and will forever maintain a stable geographic
definition of national sovereignty.
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